In September 2025, Dr. Farzam Kamal Abadi—a well-known figure within the Bahá’í administrative structure and a key contributor to the socio-economic development initiatives of the Universal House of Justice of Bahaism—entered the Persian Gulf region under the title of “Special Envoy of the President of Botswana.” During his visit, he arranged a series of high-level meetings with Bahraini officials and prominent regional economic elites. This trip was framed within the context of a project titled “Strategic Partnership of Diamond and Pearl,” which aims to establish a financial and investment corridor between the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
However, what appears on the surface to be an economic and diplomatic initiative is, according to critics of the Bahá’í Faith, potentially part of a broader strategy to strengthen the institutional influence of the Universal House of Justice within regional political and financial structures. Based on claims and reports from the website of “Future Trends,” a company owned by Farzam Kamal Abadi—who has previously played roles in the similar projects in China and East Asia—it is suggested that he is now expanding his activities in the Persian Gulf under the dual guise of his private enterprise and official representation from the President of Botswana.
In the official statement released, the key areas of cooperation include:
- Establishing a PGCC–SADC financial corridor aimed at positioning Bahrain as the financial hub of the Middle East and Botswana as the resource center of Africa
- Collaboration in the energy sector through BAPCO and Botswana’s oil and gas reserves
- Development of fintech, Islamic finance, and the issuance of sukuk
- Launching a boutique airline to connect African capitals
- Joint investment in agriculture and food security
- Strategic alignment of the two countries’ sovereign wealth funds (Pula Fund and Mumtalakat)
While these initiatives outwardly reflect Botswana’s development-oriented goals, critics argue that they may also serve as a platform for expanding the institutional influence of the Bahá’í administrative network within the region’s financial, educational, and social infrastructures—particularly in light of Farzam Kamal Abadi’s prior involvement in similar projects in China, where both formal and informal Bahá’í structures reportedly operated in parallel and covertly.
The exclusive ceremony held in Dubai in honor of the President of Botswana—with the attendance of Emirati royal family members, financial executives, and African advisors—further underscores the seriousness of efforts to establish a transnational network of influence and strategic engagement. A network that, according to some observers, may ultimately serve the long-term objectives of the Universal House of Justice in the region.
Under such circumstances, a series of fundamental and thought-provoking questions arise: Is this project merely an economic and national collaboration aimed at advancing Botswana’s development? Or, as some analysts emphasize, is it part of a broader strategic plan by the Bahá’í administrative network to establish a meaningful presence within regional and international power structures?
Shouldn’t greater scrutiny and vigilance be applied to the roles of individuals affiliated with this network who appear under diplomatic and economic guises, and shouldn’t their activities be closely monitored? The core question is:
What is the Bahá’í administration’s strategy for gaining influence in developing countries?
Is the primary goal to offer development models and contribute to these nations’ progress, or is it to expand Bahá’í proselytization and recruit new adherents?
And ultimately, is this form of presence and influence solely intended to promote the Bahá’í Faith across various countries, or does it also pave the way for financial and economic exploitation?
By Marya Amini
